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Note

United States v. Mezzanatto: An Unheeded
Plea to Keep the Exclusionary Provisions
of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e)(6) Intact
I.

Introduction

In August of 1991, defendant Gary Mezzanatto was arrested for possession of narcotics.' When he and his attorney
approached the prosecutor to attempt to plea bargain, they
were told that plea bargain discussions would only be available
under one condition: that Mr. Mezzanatto sign a waiver of his
right to have any statements made during the plea negotiations
2
excluded from use for impeachment purposes at trial.
Generally speaking, Federal Rule of Evidence 4103 [hereinafter Rule 410] and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
1. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 800 (1995). The trial court
opinion was unreported; therefore, all facts and holdings of that case referred to in
this Note are taken from the United States Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions.
2. See id.
3. FED. R. EvID. 410. The text of the rule is as follows:
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements.
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is
not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant
who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;

231

1

PACE LAW REVIEW

232

[Vol. 17:231

11(e)(6) 4 [hereinafter Rule 11(e)(6)], which govern plea negotiations, preclude the use of statements made during a plea negotiation as evidence against a defendant at trial. 5 By asking for
and obtaining a waiver of this right, the prosecutor would be
able to use the statements made by Gary Mezzanatto at trial in
the event that the plea negotiations did not result in a plea of
guilty.6 Faced with the option of potentially having his words
used against him later, or not bargaining at all (in which event
he would have little hope of a charge reduction or dismissal),
7
Mr. Mezzanatto chose to sign the waiver.
(3)

any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state
procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of
guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has
been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record
and in the presence of counsel.
Id.
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6). The text of the rule is as follows:
Rule 11. Pleas.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of the following is
not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant
who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(B) a plea of nolo contendere;
(C) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under this
rule regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or
which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has
been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record,
and in the presence of counsel.

Id.
5. FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(6).

6. See Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 800.
7. See id.
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The prosecutor and Mr. Mezzanatto failed to reach a plea
agreement, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of California allowed Mr. Mezzanatto's statements
to be used against him at trial, where he was subsequently convicted.8 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the prosecution's waiver demand should not have been permitted, as Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) [hereinafter collectively referred to
as Rules] do not provide for such a waiver. 9 The United States
Supreme Court heard the case in late 1994, and in early 1995 it
reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 7-2 decision.' 0 The Court held
that a defendant may waive the rights granted to him by these
Rules, as long as the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily
made. 11

As a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision,
any prosecutor may require that such a waiver be signed prior
to discussing any plea negotiations. Insistence upon a waiver
such as the one allowed by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Mezzanatto' 2 places a defendant in jeopardy
should the parties fail to agree upon a plea. If a defendant signs
a waiver of his right to have plea bargain statements excluded
from use against him at trial, and subsequently takes the stand
in his own defense, under the Court's holding in Mezzanatto he
may be impeached by the prosecutor with any contrary admissions made during the bargaining session.
Part II of this Note will discuss plea bargaining, the content
and legislative history of the Rules, and the general presumption of waivability of the Federal Rules. Additionally, it will
discuss those rules and rights which cannot be waived by a defendant and the importance of looking at legislative intent
when determining which of the Federal Rules are subject to
waiver. Part III will summarize in detail the facts and holding
of United States v. Mezzanatto.13 Part IV will evaluate the decision of the United States Supreme Court in light of legislative
8. See id. at 801.
9. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
10. See Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 799-800.
11. See id. at 806.
12. 115 S. Ct. 797.
13. Id.

3

234

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:231

intent, and will analyze what the future of these Rules will hold
and what the potential consequences of this case will be with
regard to defendants' rights. Part V will conclude that, in Mezzanatto, the Court failed to recognize the design of Congress by
allowing the background presumption of waivability of rules
and rights to supersede the clear legislative intent behind Rule
410 and Rule 11(e)(6).
II. Background
A. Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining, in general terms, reduces the potential
sentence that a defendant may receive in exchange for a guilty
plea by that defendant. 14 Typically, a prosecutor will promise to
dismiss or reduce a charge, or recommend a certain sentence to
the judge, in exchange for the defendant's plea. 15 The Rules
consider both charge and sentence bargains in their context;
charge bargains are "predicated on the dismissal of other
charges," while sentence bargains are "predicated either upon
the recommendation of or agreement not to oppose a particular
6
sentence, or upon a guarantee of a particular sentence."'
Plea bargains or negotiations can occur in two types of situations: charge or sentence bargaining, 7 and bargaining in exchange for cooperation with a prosecutor.' 8 In a charge or
sentence bargaining context, the purpose of the plea bargain is
to reach an agreement between the prosecutor and defense
counsel as to what charge will be used or what sentence will be
recommended in exchange for the plea.' 9 In the context of bargaining in exchange for cooperation, the prosecutor looks to
gain information from the defendant, in exchange for which the
prosecutor is willing to compromise on the charges he imposes
upon the defendant. 20 A common example of this can be found
14. See 8 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 11.02, at
11-38 (2d ed. 1996).
15. See id.
16. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985).
17. See, e.g., id. at 1456.
18. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).

19. See Carrigan,778 F.2d at 1462.
20. See Hughes, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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in conspiracy cases, or in cases where a defendant will offer information about other offenses or offenders in exchange for
21
leniency.
The prosecutor has a great deal of discretion in plea bargaining 22 and, some might say, an unfair advantage. 23 The
prosecution generally controls all of the terms and conditions of
the negotiation and can even refuse to negotiate with a given
defendant, 24 as a defendant does not have a Constitutional right
to a plea bargain. 25 Furthermore, prosecutors may forego the
plea bargain process entirely and proceed to trial, if they so
choose. 26 Notwithstanding the prosecutor's enormous discretion, it is assumed that prosecutors will not abuse their responsibility.2 7 As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
"tradition and experience justify our belief that the great majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their duty."28 In fact, "in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that
29
[public officers] have properly discharged their official duties."
Plea bargains are an important tool utilized by the criminal
justice system for expedient disposition of cases. 30 The use of
plea bargaining to dispose of cases decreases the expense and
21. See id. at 13-14; see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455
(9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995). The court there stated:

prosecutors of those engaged in criminal conspiracies desire the fullest cooperation of those accused of participation therein. Frequently only by such
cooperation can the organizers of the conspiracy, the higher-ups, be identified and prosecuted. Rules 11(e)(6) and 410 aid in obtaining this coopera-

tion. A lesser member of the conspiracy will more freely provide useful
information to the prosecutors if he knows that none of his statements in
plea bargaining sessions can be used against him.

Id.
22. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
23. See Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1456 (declaring "the government should not
be given the ability to extract a waiver of these rules from a defendant who is in a

weak bargaining position.").
24. See Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1294 (5th Cir. 1993) ("It is well established that a prosecutor has discretion to enter into plea bargains with some
defendants and not with others.").
25. See United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 486
U.S. 153 (1988).
26. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
27. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995).

28. Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397 (1987) (plurality opinion).
29. United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).
30. See Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1454.
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time needed to conduct a trial, and is an efficient way of dealing
with criminals while minimizing the burden on the court
system. 3 1
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the
guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned."3 2 In
Santobello v. New York, 3 where a prosecutor breached the plea
bargain agreement entered into with the defendant, the Court
discussed the importance of plea negotiations, stating that:
[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
pros34
pects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
For these reasons, among others, it is an "essential component
35
of the administration of justice" and "is to be encouraged."
This system of bargaining has become standard practice in disposing of criminal cases, 36 and benefits both the prosecutor and

31. See id.; see also Bradley I. Ruskin, The JudiciaryBudget Crisis, 205 N.Y.
L.J. 95 (1991). Mr. Ruskin notes that the court system is currently overburdened,
and states:
[olne can observe the magnitude of the crisis in every one of our courts. For
example.... the Criminal Courts have had to respond to huge increases
over the past five years, which make the proper administration of justice
impossible and plea bargains the inexorable reality in a system where a
complete trial occurs in only approximately one third of [one] percent of
indictments.
Id.
32. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
33. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
34. Id. at 261.
35. Id. at 260.
36. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERROLD H. ISRAEL, 2
§ 20.1, at 556 (1984).
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the guilty defendant. 37 To help administer this system of case
disposition and to ensure fairness to both parties, Congress enacted the plea negotiation rules, Federal Rule of Evidence 410
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6).38
B. FederalRule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6)
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e)(6) are substantively identical, 39 and state in
relevant part:
[elxcept as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against
the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea
discussions: ... any statement made in the course of plea discus-

sions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not
result in a plea of guilty .... 40

These Rules as to the inadmissibility of statements made
during the course of a plea bargain have only two exceptions:
such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness
be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made
by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of
counsel. 41
The first exception may be summarized as follows: if, during the course of a subsequent trial or other proceeding, a defendant introduces statements that were made during the plea
bargain negotiations, he has opened the door for the prosecution
to also introduce such statements in order that the jury might
get a complete account of the proceeding. 42 The second exception, that the statements are admissible in a separate proceed37. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978) (stating that the government "may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for
the plea").
38. See generally FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes; FED. R. CRIM.

P. 11(e)(6) advisory committee's notes.
39. See supra notes 3-4.
40. FED. R. EVID. 410; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6).
41. FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
42. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
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ing against the defendant for perjury, allows for the
punishment of a defendant who takes the stand and gives testimony which is contrary to his statements given during the plea
negotiations. 43 This exception provides for the admissibility of
statements made during plea negotiations in a separate trialfor
perjury, and not in the trial for the original offense."
The Rules were enacted in 1975, 45 and as subsequently
amended, resulted in the versions currently used today.4 In
1975, the original Court's Evidence Rule 410 was in the process
of revision to be added to the Federal Rules of Evidence as Rule
410. 47 At this time, the Senate proposed the addition of the following language to Rule 410: "[t]his Rule shall not apply to the
introduction of voluntary and reliable statements made in court
on the record in connection with [an offer to plead guilty] where
offered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecution of the declarant for perjury or false statement."48 The Conference Committee, the congressional committee in charge of
analyzing proposals to the Federal Rules, adopted the Senate
proposal, 49 but with a provision that Rule 410 would "be superseded by any amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which is inconsistent with this rule, and which takes
effect after the date of the enactment of the Act establishing
these Federal Rules of Evidence." 50 Rule 410 was thus enacted
on January 2, 1975, and was scheduled to take effect on August
1, 1975, provided that there were not any amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which would supersede
Rule 410. 51
43. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(6).
44. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6).
45. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-64, § 3(10), 89 Stat. 370, 372 (1975); Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 1(9), 89 Stat. 805
(1975).
46. FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(6); see supra notes 3-4.
47. See 10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 410.01[1.2], at IV-185-86 (2d ed. 1996).
48. See id. at IV-188.
49. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 6-7 (1974) reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7100.
50. See 10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 47, § 410.01 [1.-2], at IV-185 (quoting
Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933
(1975)).
51. See id.
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The Conference Committee noted that the issue of plea
statement admissibility was about to be discussed again in the
context of revisions to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which revisions, as proposed, were "inconsistent" with the Conference's Evidence Rule 410.52 The proposed versions offered by
the Senate and the House of Representatives were at odds with
each other as to the language to be used in Rule 11(e)(6). 53 The
version of Rule 11(e)(6) proposed by the House permitted the
limited use of pleas of guilty, later withdrawn, or nolo contendere, 54 offers of such pleas, and statements made in connection
with such pleas or offers [to be used] in a perjury or false statement prosecution if the plea, offer, or related statement was made
under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel. 55
In contrast, the Senate version permitted "evidence of voluntary
and reliable statements made in court on the record to be used
for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the declarant or
in a perjury or false statement prosecution." 56 The Conference
Committee adopted the House version with some changes, expressly rejecting the language offered by the Senate which
would have allowed the use of plea statements to impeach the
credibility of the declarant.5 7 In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Committee stated,
"[t]he Conference adopts the House version with changes. The
52. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 6-7 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7100.
53. See 10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 47, § 410.03[1], at IV-193.
54. Nolo contendere is defined as:
a plea in a criminal case which has a similar legal effect as pleading guilty.
Type of plea which may be entered with leave of court to a criminal complaint or indictment by which the defendant does not admit or deny the
charges, though a fine or sentence may be imposed pursuant to it. The principal difference between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere is that
the latter may not be used against the defendant in a civil action based upon
the same acts.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-414, at 10 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
713, 714.
56. Id. (emphasis added). No Senate report accompanied this proposal; therefore all information regarding the Senate's proposed legislation for Rule 11(e)(6) is
taken from the Conference Report.
57. See id.
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Conference agrees that neither a plea nor the offer of a plea
58
ought to be admissible for any purpose."
On July 31, 1975, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Amendments Act became law, amending, among other things,
Rule 11(e)(6). 59 On December 12, 1975, a version of Rule 410
which was identical in substance to Rule 11(e)(6) was passed by
Congress, 60 thus conforming Rule 410 to Rule 11(e)(6), and sub61
stantively resulting in the version of Rule 410 used today.
It is important to note that while the Rules do not expressly
prohibit waiver in their text,62 their legislative history indicates
that Congress carefully considered and set forth within the
body of the Rules the circumstances under which statements
63
made in the course of plea negotiations should be admissible.
While the Rules say that evidence of a statement made during a
plea bargain is not allowed to be admitted against the participating defendant in a civil or criminal proceeding, the Rules do
not speak to a defendant's ability or inability to waive this protection granted to him.6 4 In the absence of an express mention
of waiver, the courts are left to decide the legislative intent with
65
respect to waiver when the Rules were enacted by Congress.
C.

Presumption of Waivability

The United States Supreme Court has stated that, "[r]ather
than deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some
sort of express enabling clause," there should be a presumption
that rights and rules may be waived. 66 In fact, over a century
58. Id.
59. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-64, § 3(10), 89 Stat. 370, 372 (1975).
60. Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 1(9), 89 Stat. 805 (1975).
61. FED. R. EviD. 410. An amendment to Rule 11(e)(6) was enacted in 1979
which more precisely described what evidence of pleas and plea discussions is
inadmissible. FED R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)(6) advisory committee's note. At this time, the
Advisory Committee again addressed the legislative intent behind these Rules,
stating, "this history shows that the purpose of [FED. R. EVID. 410 and FED. R.
CRIM. P.] 11(e)(6) is to permit the unrestrained candor which produces effective
plea discussions . . . ." Id.
62. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
63. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
65. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).
66. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995).
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ago, in Shutte v. Thompson,67 the Court stated, "[a] party may
waive any provision, either of a contract or of a statute, intended for his benefit."6 While the waiver referred to in Shutte
was concerned with the protections surrounding a deposition,
this language has since been used to justify waivers of several
69
different types of rights and privileges.
Courts have allowed for the waiver of several Constitu70
tional rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and right to be present at all stages of a trial,7 1 the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 72 and the
Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and
seizure.7 3 While a prevailing party in a civil rights action is, by
statute, eligible for attorney fees, that eligibility may also be
waived. 74 Furthermore, a defendant can waive his privilege
against being placed in double jeopardy, 75 his right to a public
trial, 76 his right to have hearsay evidence precluded from use
against him at trial, 77 and his right to object to documentary
evidence if admissibility of that evidence is stipulated to prior to
trial. 78 A defendant waives his rights by making a knowing and
voluntary guilty plea, 79 and by failing to assert his rights at

67. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 151 (1873).
68. Id. at 159.
69. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
70. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
71. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985).
72. See United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); Segurola v.
United States, 275 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1927).
74. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32 (1986).
75. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987); United States v. Bascaro,
742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984).
76. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960).
77. See Sac and Fox Indians of Miss. in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of Miss.
in Okla., 220 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1911).
78. See United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1989);
Tupman Thurlow Co. v. S.S. Cap Castillo, 490 F.2d 302, 309 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Wing, 450 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1971).
79. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating that a guilty
plea waives a defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to
jury trial, and right to confront one's accusers).
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trial in a timely way. 0 In sum, "[tihe most basic rights of criminal defendants are similarly subject to waiver." 81
In fact, courts have liberally enforced contracts to alter the
Evidence Rules.8 2 "[A] contract to deprive the court of relevant
testimony... stands on a different ground than one admitting
evidence that would otherwise have been barred by an exclusionary rule. One contract is an impediment to ascertaining the
facts, the other aids in the final determination of the true situation."8 Accordingly, a defendant may waive a great many privi84
leges and rights both before and during the trial process.
D.

Rules/Rights Which Cannot Be Waived

While courts have allowed waiver of many rights, 85 there
are a great many circumstances in which waiver is not permitted by the courts.8 6 Waiver can be rendered impermissible by
express language in a statute or rule prohibiting a waiver of
that statute or rule.8 7 Such an express statement of intent not
to allow waiver of a Federal Rule of Evidence or a Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure can indicate Congressional intent to "occupy the field," thereby leaving no question of interpretation to
the courts. 88
In Smith v. United States,8 9 the United States Supreme
Court discussed an example of an express clause in a statute
which prohibits waiver.90 The Court, in Smith, dealt with the
80. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,444 (1944) ("No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited
in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.").
81. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (questioning whether a
waiver could be used so that a magistrate instead of an Article III judge could
preside over felony jury trial selection, the Court held "there is no Constitutional
infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the
litigants consent").
82. See Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARv.L. REV. 138,
142-43 (1933).
83. Id. at 142-43.
84. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S.Ct. 797, 801-02 (1995).
88. Id.
89. 360 U.S. 1 (1959).
90. See id.
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waiver provision contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a). 91 In Smith, the defendant was charged with transporting a kidnapping victim across state lines, a crime which
carried a maximum sentence of death.9 2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a) provided that "[an offense which may be
punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by
indictment or, if indictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by
information." 93 This rule, therefore, allowed for a waiver of
prosecution by indictment, but only in non-capital cases. 94 The
United States Attorney for the case sought and received a
waiver of the defendant's right to indictment, and defendant
was sentenced, at the trial court level, to thirty years in
prison. 95 The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that "[t]o construe the provisions of the Rule
loosely to permit the use of informations where, as here, the
charge states a capital offense, would do violence to that Rule
."96

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 [hereinafter Rule
431 is another rule which cannot be waived. 97 Rule 43 requires
the presence of a defendant "at the arraignment, at the time of
the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of
the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule."9 8 How-

ever, the continuity of a trial shall not be suspended if the defendant, having been present at the beginning of the trial, is
voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced. 99 In Crosby v.
United States,100 the United States Supreme Court considered
the issue of whether the government could begin a trial in absentia of a defendant who had fled the jurisdiction. 10 1 The gov91. See id. at 6.
92. See id. at 2.
93. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (a).
94. See id.
95. See Smith, 360 U.S. at 3-4.
96. Id. at 9.
97. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43.
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
99. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1).
100. 506 U.S. 255 (1995).
101. See id. at 256.
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ernment argued that, while Rule 43 did not specifically
authorize a trial in absentia, it also did not "purport to contain a
comprehensive listing of the circumstances under which the
right to be present may be waived." 10 2 Therefore, the government reasoned, the defendant had waived his right to be present at trial as a result of his flight. 0 3 The United States
Supreme Court disagreed with the prosecution's argument and
stated that the right to be present was considered unwaivable
in felony cases, at common law, 04 and that the presence of a
defendant at the beginning of trial is necessary to be sure that
his absence is knowing and voluntary. 10 5 Therefore, a defendant cannot waive his right to be present by virtue of not being
present at the beginning of trial. 06
The Court, in Wheat v. United States, 0 7 refused to uphold a
defendant's waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel. 08 The
Court stated that "where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver, and insist that defendants be separately
represented." 10 9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
agreed that there are limitations as to what waivers the courts
should allow." 0 As the court humorously stated, "[n]o doubt
there are limits to waiver; if the parties stipulated to trial by
[twelve] orangutans the defendant's conviction would be invalid
notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless of
what the defendant wants or is willing to accept.""'
102. See id. at 258 (quoting Brief for United States at 16, Crosby v. United
States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) (No. 91-6194)).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 259.
106. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1995).
107. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
108. See id. at 164.
109. Id. at 162.
110. See United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1985). The defendant
in Joselik agreed to waive the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
24(c) and allow an excused alternate juror to deliberate; the court upheld the defendant's conviction in a later challenge to the waiver since there was not any
prejudice to him in this instance. See id. at 587.
111. Id. at 588.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/4

14

19961

AN UNHEEDED PLEA

245

While the presence of an express clause in a rule can make
waiver unavailable, waiver will also be prohibited in instances
where the legislative history of a statute or rule evidences intent not to allow waiver. 112 In Brooklyn Savings Bank v.
O'Neil," 3 the structure and legislative history of the Fair Labor
Standards Act" 4 made unwaivable particular statutory entitlements guaranteed to employees because the entitlements
evinced a specific "legislative policy" of "prevent[ing] private
contracts" on such matters. 115 William O'Neil was employed for
16
two years as a night watchman for Brooklyn Savings Bank."
The hours he worked entitled him to overtime compensation
under the Fair Labor Standards Act."17 No such compensation
was paid to him during the term of his employment." 8 Over
two years after O'Neil left his job, Brooklyn Savings Bank calculated what they owed to O'Neil under the terms of the Act, and
offered him a check in exchange for a waiver of any rights he
had under the Act." 9 O'Neil agreed to the Bank's offer, accepted the check, and signed the release given to him. 120 The
check amount did not include any compensation for liquidated
damages arising from Brooklyn Savings Bank's failure to timely
2
pay the overtime wages.' '
O'Neil brought an action in New York City Municipal Court
122
to recover the liquidated damages due to him under the Act.
His complaint was dismissed by that court because he "failed to
prove a cause of action" and because he had "released any claim
for liquidated damages or counsel fees." 123 This decision was reversed by the Appellate Term, which held that O'Neil was an
employee within the meaning of the Act, and, as such, he was
entitled to recover compensation resulting from his employer's
112. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 712-13 (1945).
113. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
114. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1995)).
115. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 324 U.S. at 706.
116. See id. at 699.
117. See id. at 699-700.
118. See id. at 700.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 700 (1945).
122. See id.
123. Id.
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failure to make overtime payments to him as required by the
Act. 124 The holding of the Appellate Term was affirmed by the
New York Appellate Division 125 and by the New York Court of
Appeals, 126 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 27 to determine "whether the respondent's release of all
further claims and damages under the Act, given at the time he
received payment of the overtime compensation due under the
Act, is a defense to an action subsequently brought solely to re28
cover liquidated damages."
The Court preliminarily determined that O'Neil's relinquishment of his right to make a claim under the Act for the
liquidated damage amount constituted a waiver of his right
rather than acceptance of a settlement offer for a dispute over
the amount to be paid.129 The Court, having decided that
O'Neil's actions were a waiver of his rights under the Act,
turned to the question of whether or not such a waiver was
permissible.130
It has been held in this and other courts that a statutory right
conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may
not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes
the statutory policy. Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so
charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed
where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed
to effectuate. With respect to private rights created by a federal
statute, . ..the question of whether the statutory right may be
intention of Congress as manifested in
waived depends upon the
3
the particular statute.' '
124. See id. at 700-01.
125. O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 267 A.D. 317, 46 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1943).
126. O'Neil v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 293 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 259 (1944).
127. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 323 U.S. 698 (1944).
128. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 701 (1945).
129. See id. at 703. This question of whether the release was given by O'Neil
"in settlement of a bona fide dispute between the parties with respect to coverage
or amount due under the Act or whether it constituted a mere waiver of his right to
liquidated damages" was not determined by the trial court or any of the other state
courts. Id. The United States Supreme Court's finding that the release given by
O'Neil was not in exchange for a settlement offer, but instead constituted a "mere
waiver" allowed them to address the question of whether such a waiver of O'Neil's
right to liquidated damages could be upheld. See id. at 703-04.
130. See id. at 704.
131. Id. at 704-05 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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The Court in Brooklyn found that "[n]either the statutory
language, the legislative reports nor the debates indicates that
the question [of whether or not this right may be waived] was
specifically considered and resolved by Congress." 132 The Court
further stated that "[i]n the absence of evidence of specific Congressional intent, it becomes necessary to resort to a broader
consideration of the legislative policy behind this provision as
evidenced by its legislative history and the provisions in and
structure of the Act." 33 Reviewing the legislative history of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court found that Congress' inof the populatent in creating the Act was to protect segments
34
employers.
by
exploitation
tion from potential
The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal
bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to
prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency and35as a result the free movement of
goods in interstate commerce.'
The Court further stated that "[tlo permit an employer to secure
a release from the worker who needs his wages promptly will
tend to nullify the deterrent effect which Congress plainly intended that [Section] 16(b) [of the Fair Labor Standards Act]
should have." 36 Allowing contracts whereby a party's rights
are waived "approximates situations where courts have uniformly held that contracts tending to encourage violation of
laws are void as contrary to public policy." 37 Petitioner Brooklyn Savings Bank argued that in other instances where waivers
of rights have been prohibited, there has been a specific provision in the acts or statutes in question which prohibited a
waiver of those rights.138 Therefore, as the Fair Labor Standards Act does not speak to waivability of its provisions, waiver
should not be prohibited. 39 The Court's response to this argument was that "[t]here is no indication why Congress did not
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 705-06 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 706.
See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).
Id. at 706-07 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 712.
See id.
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embody a similar provision in the Act under consideration in
this case. Absence of such provisions, however, has not prevented the courts from invalidating waivers where the legisla140
tive policy would be thwarted by permitting such contracts."
In sum, there is an assumption by the United States
Supreme Court that the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure are presumptively waivable, and to rebut that
presumption there must be a showing that a specific rule is not
waivable.14 ' An express provision in a rule stating that waiver
of that rule is not permitted would evidence this. 42 In the absence of such a provision stating that the right or privilege contained therein is not subject to waiver, a court must look to the
legislative intent behind the rules. 43
E. Evidence of Legislative Intent To Counter Judicial
Intervention
It is Congress' job to make the rules and the courts' job to
45
enforce those rules.'" In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
the petitioner allegedly sought to circumvent the Endangered
Species Act 146 and complete erection of a dam in an area
designed to protect wildlife." 47 In reviewing the Act, the Court

stated "[o]ur individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of
a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment is discerned.
the judicial process
comes to an end."'4
140. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 713 (1945).
141. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995).
142. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a); see supra notes 89-96 and accompanying
text.
143. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 324 U.S. at 706.
144. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given
area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce

them when enforcement is sought.").
145. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
146. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, §§ 2-15, 17, 87 Stat.
884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1995)).
147. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 162.
148. Id. at 194.
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The United States Supreme Court again held in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington149 that "[t]he ultimate question is one
of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks
that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress
enacted into law."150 Thus, when a rule is silent or ambiguous a
court must look to the intent behind the rule to determine Congress' reasoning rather than attempt to usurp the legislature's
authority. 151 Evidence of congressional intent is often found in
the Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules, 152 and in
the conference or committee reports. 53 In the introduction immediately preceding the Federal Rules of Evidence, the late Edward Cleary, Reporter to the Advisory Committee for the
Federal Rules of Evidence, stated that "[tihe involved congressional committees and subcommittees were thoroughly familiar
with the Notes, and except where changes were made in the
rules, the Notes should be taken as the equivalent of a congressional committee report as representing the thinking of Congress."154 He further stated:
[q]uestions as to what a rule really means present probably the
most basic problem of interpretation. The language of the rule
itself should be taken as the prime source of meaning, read in the
light of such context as may be relevant. The most relevant context will often be legislative history, which on occasion may override an apparently plain and unmistakable meaning of the words
of the rule. The result may be startling, as when the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that a conviction for attempted burglary used for impeachment under Rule
609(a) did not involve dishonesty as the language was used in the
difficult
rule. Yet the opposite conclusion would have been most
55
to reach in view of the legislative history of the rule.
149. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
150. Id. at 578.
151. See Brooklyn Savings Bank, 324 U.S. at 706.
152. See Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2442 (1994) (Kennedy,

J., concurring).
153. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
System, 472 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (stating that conference or committee reports
indicate legislative intent).
154. Edward W. Cleary, Introduction to FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR
UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES at iv

(1984).

155. Id. at v (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Williamson v.
United States 156 discussed the United States Supreme Court's
recognition of Advisory Committee Notes for use as evidence of
157
legislative intent.
When as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not answer a
question that must be answered in order to apply the Rule, and
when the Advisory Committee Note does answer the question, our
practice indicates that we should pay attention to the Advisory
Committee Note. We have referred often to those Notes in interpreting the Rules of Evidence, and I see no reason to jettison that
well-established practice here. 158
In Hudleston v. United States, 59 the Court looked to the
Advisory Committee's Notes for guidance in the interpretation
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) [hereinafter Rule 404(b)].160
The petitioner in that case asked the Court to read Rule 404(b)
as mandating a preliminary showing that evidence to be introduced is for a proper purpose before it can be concluded that the
trial court should introduce it at trial. 16' The rule contained
nothing in its text to intimate such a reading, and so the Court
looked to the Advisory Committee Notes for guidance. 62 The
Advisory Committee specifically declined to comment on this
and stated that "the trial court should assess such evidence
under the usual rules for admissibility." 16 3 The Court then concluded that such a reading was "simply inconsistent with the
4
legislative history behind Rule 404(b)."16
Similarly, in the case of United States v. Owens, 65 the
United States Supreme Court noted that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules evidenced that Congress was aware of a
problematic evidentiary issue, and that Congress declined to
make an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C)
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
See id. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
485 U.S. 681 (1988).
See id.
See id. at 686-87.
See id. at 687-88.
Id. at 688.
Id.
484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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[hereinafter Rule 801(d)(1)(C)] in order to resolve the issue. 166
Under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), a prior statement identifying a person
is not hearsay if the declarant is "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement."16 7 In Owens, a corrections guard
who was allegedly attacked by respondent Owens was unable to
respond at trial to cross-examination questions concerning the
attack, due to memory loss caused by his injuries. 168 Respondent Owens argued that since, due to memory loss, the declarant in this case was unable to explain the basis for his
identification of the respondent, the identification should be
considered hearsay and excluded from use at trial. 16 9 The Court
disagreed, stating that the declarant was subject to cross-examination at trial, and that an assertion of memory loss "can be
effective in destroying the force of the prior statement." 170 The
Court further noted that Congress was aware of the problem of
"witness forgetfulness of an underlying event," since they defined unavailability of a witness in Rule 804(a)(3) to encompass
situations where a declarant "testifies to a lack of memory of the
subject matter of [his] statement."17' However, the Court noted,
Congress chose not to write a similar provision into Rule 801.172
"The reasons for that choice are apparent from the Advisory
Committee's Notes on Rule 801 and its legislative history ....
Thus, despite the traditional view that such statements were
hearsay, the Advisory Committee believed that their use was to
be fostered rather than discouraged." 73
Committee reports, too, represent the thoughts and intent
of Congress, as "[a] committee report represents the considered
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
drafting and studying proposed legislation." 174 In fact, the
United States Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, "[the most

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 562.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
See Owens, 484 U.S. at 556.
See id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3)).
See id. at 562.

173. Id.

174. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).
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dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the
175
responsible committees."
F.

Rule 410 and 11(e)(6) - Can They Be Waived?

As stated above, Rule 410 and Rule 11(e)(6) make no express mention of waiver in their text. 176 Therefore, absent a
showing that these Rules are exempt from the general rule, that
rules and statutes are presumptively waivable by those that
would benefit from them,177 waiver should be upheld. 178 In the
case of plea bargaining rules, however, a great deal has been
written as to the legislative intent behind the promulgation of
these Rules, 179 which the United States Supreme Court in Mez80
zanatto found unpersuasive
The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules do not expressly discuss waiver.' 8 ' The Advisory Committee Notes do
state quite clearly, however, that "[e]xclusion of offers to plead
guilty or nolo has as its purpose the promotion of disposition of
criminal cases by compromise." 82 Additionally, the Conference
Committee expressly rejected the language offered by the Senate when the Rules were promulgated which would have allowed an exception to the Rules so that a defendant's credibility
could be impeached. 8 3 As was noted by the American Bar Association commentary, a rule contrary to the one adopted by
Congress "would discourage plea negotiations and agreements,
for defendants would have to be constantly concerned whether,
in light of their plea negotiation activities, they could success175. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, Secretary of Educ., 456 U.S. 512, 548
at n.11 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. See supra notes 3-4, 62-65 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II.C.
178. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995).
179. See infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text; see supra notes 48-58 and
accompanying text.
180. See Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 805 n.5.
181. See FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes; FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(e)(6) advisory committee's notes.
182. FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes; FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(6)
advisory committee's notes (quoting FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes).
183. See FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes; FED R. CRIM. P.
11(e)(6) advisory committee's notes; see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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fully defend on the merits if a plea ultimately was not
84
entered."'
Circuit courts have addressed the issue of the use of plea
statements for impeachment purposes since the promulgation
of the Rules. 185
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v.
Verdoorn, 86 faced this issue when two appellants argued that
the trial court erred in not allowing them to show that all of the
defendants had been offered sentence reductions in exchange
for their testimony against co-conspirators. 8 7 The appellants
believed that such a showing would have "challenge[d] the credibility of the government's entire case, i.e., disclose[d] the
lengths to which the government [would have gone] in attempting to obtain vital testimony to prosecute its dase," and therefore, evidence of the offer of a plea bargain was improperly
excluded. 8 8 The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the
then-recently promulgated Rule 11(e)(6) forbade admissibility
of offers to plea. 8 9 "If such a policy is to be fostered, it is essential that plea negotiations remain confidential to the parties if
they are unsuccessful," stated the court. 190 "Meaningful dialogue between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume the risk that plea offers
would be admissible in evidence." 191
The Second Circuit spoke on this issue in United States v.
Lawson, 192 where the government used plea negotiation statements to impeach defendant Lawson's testimony at trial. 193 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in deciding whether or not
plea bargain statements were incorrectly admitted, stated that
"w]e are aided in resolving this question by an unusually clear
legislative history. In considering these rules, Congress debated and rejected proposals that statements made in connection with an offer to plead guilty be available for impeachment
184.
1980).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14-3.4, commentary at 90 (2d ed.
See infra notes 186-95.
528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
See id. at 107.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
683 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1982).
See id. at 691.
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purposes." 194 After a lengthy discussion of the legislative history of the Rules, the court declared, "[we regard this legislative history as demonstrating Congress' explicit intention to
preclude use of statements made in plea negotiations for impeachment purposes." 195
Treatises, too, have commented on the subject. LaFave and
Israel, in their text Criminal Procedure, stated that waiver of
the exclusionary provisions of the Rules could have a "chilling
effect" on the entire plea bargaining process. 196 Additionally,
the well-regarded treatise, Federal Practice and Procedure,197
by Wright & Graham, oft quoted by the United States Supreme
Court in its opinion in United States v. Mezzanatto, 98 stated:
[a]t common law and under the original version of Rule 410, pleaconnected statements could be used as prior inconsistent statements to impeach the person who made the plea. Some courts
also permitted pleas to be used for this purpose. Although it
might be argued that the use of the evidence for this purpose is
not substantive and therefore is not "against" the person who
made the plea, the legislative history makes it clear beyond any
doubt that Congress, in deleting the impeachment provision from
the original rule, intended that Rule 410 should bar the use of
pleas and plea related statements for impeachment. 199
Thus, although the Rules do not expressly address the issue
of waiver in their text, there is a great deal of legislative history
to indicate that Congress carefully considered the particular circumstances wherein statements made during the course of plea
negotiations should be admissible. Congress' rejection of the
Senate proposal, coupled with the inclusion in the Rules of a
remedy allowing for punishment of a perjuring defendant,
demonstrated, to many, Congress' clear intent not to allow plea
negotiation statements to be used against a defendant at trial.

194. Id. at 692.
195. Id. at 692-93.
196. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 20.2, at 611.
197. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
AND PROCEDURE

FEDERAL PRACTICE

(1980).

198. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
199. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 197, § 5349, at 416.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/4

24

AN UNHEEDED PLEA

1996]

255

III. United States v. Mezzanatto
In August, 1991, Gary Mezzanatto was arrested in the
state of California and charged with possession of
methamphetamine, a narcotic substance. 200 Approximately two
months later, Mr. Mezzanatto and his attorney requested a
meeting with the prosecutor to discuss the possibility of a plea
bargain in exchange for Mezzanatto's cooperation with the government. 2 1 The prosecutor agreed, but on the condition that
Mezzanatto sign an agreement stating that any statements
made during the plea negotiations could be used to impeach any
contradictory testimony given at trial, should the case proceed
that far.20 2 After conferring with his attorney, Mr. Mezzanatto

agreed to the prosecution's terms and made a statement.20 3 The
prosecutor and Mr. Mezzanatto failed to reach an agreement
during the plea negotiations and the case proceeded to trial
before the United States District Court for the Southern Dis20 4
trict of California.
As part of his defense at trial, Mezzanatto took the stand to
testify. 20 5 His testimony was inconsistent with certain state-

ments made during the plea negotiations, and, over defense
counsel's protestation, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce relevant portions of Mezzanatto's plea account to contradict his testimony and impeach him. 206

Mezzanatto was

found guilty by the trial court, and was sentenced to 170
months in prison.207 Defense counsel filed an appeal, and the
case was heard by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 20 8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Mr. Mezzanatto could not waive his protection against admission of
statements he made during plea negotiations. 20 9 The Court of
Appeals further held that it was not harmless error for the trial
200. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 800 (1995).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.

204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 800-01 (1995).
207. See id. at 801.

208. See'United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
209. See id. at 1456.
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court to allow the prosecution to impeach Mezzanatto with
a
statements made during the course of plea negotiations. 2 10 As
21
result of the decision, the case was reversed and remanded. '
After providing a brief summary of the facts and the holding of the trial court, the majority opinion, written by Circuit
Judge Sneed, analyzed the scope of the Rules. 212 The court
found that neither of the two exceptions to otherwise absolute
Rules provide for the use of such statements for impeachment. 213 The court also examined the legislative history of the
Rules and determined that "Congress unmistakably did not
want statements made during plea negotiations to be used to
impeach defendants." 21 4 The majority opinion did not, however,
turn solely on Congressional intent. For the majority, the issue
was whether or not the protections afforded by the Rules could
215
be waived.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Rules
could not be waived by a defendant. 216 According to this court,
the prohibition against the admission of plea negotiation statements had to be analyzed "in the broader context of the criminal
justice system." 217 The majority declared that the Rules "were

designed to promote plea agreements by encouraging frank discussion."218 If the Rules were subject to waiver, "[m]eaningful
dialogue between the parties would, as a practical matter, be
impossible." 2 19 To allow the government to enforce its waiver

agreement would contravene the policy of efficient case resolution that the Rules were originally designed to achieve and thus
subvert legislative intent on the subject. 220 The Ninth Circuit
relied on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 1454.
213. See id.; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
214. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
215. See id.
216. See id. at 1456.
217. Id. at 1454.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1455 (quoting United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th
Cir. 1976)).
220. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
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Brooklyn Savings Bank v O'Neil,22 1 stating that "[a]llowing a
waiver of these rules would contravene and thwart the policy efficient case resolution through plea bargaining - these rules
were designed to effectuate." 222 The Ninth Circuit quoted the
language used by the Brooklyn Court, "[wihere a private right is
granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy,
waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest
will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy
223
which it was designed to effectuate."
Furthermore, the majority determined that while other
224
rights could be waived during the plea bargaining process,
the Rules are an inherent part of the negotiating system itself.225 The waiver of the Rules would do damage to the system
226
created by Congress and the United States Supreme Court.
"[The Rules] do not guarantee substantive rights so much as
they guarantee fair procedure," stated the Ninth Circuit. 227 The
majority reasoned that in the absence of Congressional mandate, courts are not free to write a waiver into a waiverless
rule.228

To write in a waiver in a waiverless rule promulgated by the
Supreme Court and Congress, on the other hand, is not an inescapable duty. It more resembles unwelcome advice. Given the
precision with which these [R]ules are generally phrased, the
comparative recentness of their promulgation, and the relative
ease with which they are amended, the courts can afford to be
hesitant in adding an important feature to an otherwise wellfunctioning rule. 229
221. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
222. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1455 n.3.
223. Id. (quoting Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)).
224. See id. at 1456. The right to pursue a civil remedy in exchange for a
dismissal of all criminal charges may be waived. See id. at 1455 (citing Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 492-98 (1987) (plurality opinion)). The right to appeal may
also be waived. See id. at 1455-56 (citing Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 319-20
(9th Cir. 1990)).
225. See Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1456.
226. See id. at 1455. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "meaningful
dialogue between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either
party had to assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence." Id.
(quoting Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107).
227. Id. at 1456.
228. See id.
229. Id.
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Finally, the court held that "the government should not be
given the ability to extract a waiver of these [Riules from a defendant who is in a weak bargaining position."2 0 Such power
would invite prosecutorial abuse 231 and act as a deterrent to a
defendant who would otherwise freely enter into a plea232bargain,
thereby frustrating the policy intended by the Rules.

In his dissent, Chief Justice Wallace began by listing a series of the fundamental Constitutional rights and protections
that a criminal defendant may waive. 23 "Against this backdrop," he then stated, "the majority create[d], without the
assistance of precedent, a per se rule which invalidates any and
all waivers of the protections afforded not by such basic and fundamental rights, but by [the Rules.]" 234 Judge Wallace further

pointed out that the majority opinion summarily ignored the
issue of whether Mezzanatto's waiver was knowing and
5
voluntary.2
The remainder of the dissenting opinion analyzed and. rejected the three bases upon which the majority arrived at its
conclusion: (1) "that to allow waiver would subvert the policies
advanced by the Rules," (2) that writing a waiver into the Rules
would amount to "'unwelcome advice' and (3) "that the availa230. Id.
231. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1993),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
232. See id. at 1456.
233. See id. (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). In his opinion, Judge Wallace stated
that "[a] criminal defendant may waive the most fundamental rights and protections afforded him or her by the Constitution or a statute." Id. (citing Peretz v.
United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912
F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990)).
A defendant, for example, may knowingly and voluntarily waive the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the
statutory rights to appeal, and to pursue valid civil rights claims against
government officials. A defendant, by failing to object at trial, also may implicitly waive his or her Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search
and seizure, Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and
against being placed in double jeopardy, and Sixth Amendment rights to be
present at all stages of trial, and to a public trial.
Id. at 1456-57 (citations omitted).
234. Id. at 1457.
235. See id.
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bility of waivers would tempt governmental abuse."2 3 6 Judge
Wallace concluded that these bases do not support the majority's position, and that there is no rational basis for distinguishing the plea statement Rules from any of the more fundamental
Constitutional rights which have already been found to be sub237
ject to waiver.
The United States Supreme Court granted the prosecutor's
petition for certiorari238 and, by a seven to two vote, reversed
the Ninth Circuit and remanded.0 9 The Court held that waiver
of the exclusionary provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 410
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) is available
with a showing that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
240
made the decision to waive.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Clarence Thomas,
stated that the Ninth Circuit's finding that a waiver is presumptively unavailable is contrary to the Court's past decisions
24 1
allowing waiver of statutory as well as Constitutional rights.
The Court noted that cases interpreting the Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure have held that waiver is presumptively
242 Stipavailable and that evidentiary rules can also be waived.
ulations regarding evidence are a regular occurrence in trial
24
practice, and serve an important purpose and function. 3
By finding a "background presumption" 244 that all rules are
waivable in the absence of "some affirmative indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver," 245 the Court decided that Mezzanatto bore the burden of showing why the provisions of the
Rules should not be waivable. 246 Respondent Mezzanatto, in response to the burden imposed upon him, raised three argu236. Id. (quoting Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1455-56).
237. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1456, 1457 (9th Cir.
1993) (Wallace, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
238. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
239. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
240. See id. at 806.
241. See id. at 801.
242. See id. at 801-02.

243. See id. at 802.
244. Id. at 803.

245. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995).
246. Id. at 803.
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ments for why these Rules should not be allowed to be waived
247
by a defendant.
Mezzanatto first asserted "that the plea statement rules establish a 'guarantee [to] fair procedure' that cannot be
waived." 248 In response to this argument, the majority agreed
that some things may not be waived and that there are limits to
waiver. 249 However, the Court found this argument to be unpersuasive, stating that enforcement of an agreement like the
one made between Mezzanatto and the prosecution here would
not "discredit the federal courts." 250 To the contrary, the majority felt that enforcement of such an agreement by allowing plearelated statements to be used for impeachment purposes at a
trial would enhance the ability of the courts to seek the truth,
251
and would result in more accurate verdicts.
Justice Thomas stated that the Rules create a privilege belonging to a defendant 2 2 which, like other evidentiary privileges, can be waived or varied by a defendant. 253 Justice
Thomas further pointed out that, while the Rules provide that
statements made by a defendant during a plea negotiation are
not admissible against that defendant, the Rules do not bar a
defendant from offering those same statements into evidence for
his own advantage. 25 4 The majority opinion viewed this aspect
of the Rules as evidence that Congress, in adopting the Rules,
anticipated "a degree of party control that is consonant with the
background presumption of waivability." 2 5 The Court then
noted that the Ninth Circuit had relied on Brooklyn Savings
247. See id. at 803-06.
248. Id. at 803 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 12, United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (No. 93-1340)).
249. See id. Justice Thomas explained that a court can refuse a defendant's
relinquishment of his right to conflict-free legal representation. See id. (citing
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988)). Thomas also quoted United
States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1985), to explain that there are limits to
waiver. See id. For the full quotation from United States v. Josefik, see supra
notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
250. See Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 803 (quoting 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHr &
KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 207-08 (1977)).
251. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 803 (1995).
252. Id.
253. See id. at 803-04.
254. See id. at 804.
255. Id.
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Bank v. O'Neil,256 but stated that Brooklyn "is easily distin257
guishable in this regard."
Brooklyn Savings Bank held that certain statutory entitlements
guaranteed to employees by the Fair Labor Standards Act were
unwaivable because the structure and legislative history of the
Act evinced a specific "legislative policy" of "prevent[ing] private
contracts" on such matters. Respondent has identified nothing in
the structure or history of the plea-statement Rules that suggests
that they were aimed at preventing private bargaining; in fact,
discussion suggests that the Rules adopt a contrary
the above
8
view. 25
Mezzanatto's second argument was that "waiver is fundamentally inconsistent with the Rules' goal of encouraging voluntary settlement." 259 When faced with the prospect of waiving
his rights to have plea negotiation statements kept inadmissi260
ble, a defendant may forego participation in a plea discussion.
"[Elnforcement of waiver agreements," argued Mezzanatto,
"acts 'as a brake, not as a facilitator, to the plea-bargain process."' 261 The majority noted that this fear of a "chilling effect"

26 2
was of primary concern to the Ninth Circuit in its decision.
The Court found that the Ninth Circuit was concerned with the
incentives of a defendant to bargain, but did not show the same
concern for the other party to the transaction, the prosecution.263 Justice Thomas stated that while some defendants may
be discouraged from negotiation when faced with a waiver,
some prosecutors might be unwilling to bargain in its absence. 264 This is particularly true in a situation where a prosecutor is searching for information which a defendant can
provide in a criminal investigation, and a plea negotiation is offered in the context of cooperation.265 Because a prosecutor
256. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
257. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 804 n.4.
258. Id. (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 804.
260. See id.
261. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 23 n.17, United States v. Mezzanatto,
115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (No. 93-1340)).
262. Id. (citing Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d at 1455).
263. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S.Ct. 797, 804 (1995).
264. See id.
265. See id.
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must know that the testimony will be credible, 26 a prosecutor
may insist on the ability to impeach a defendant for providing
false statements. 2 7 In the absence of a waiver agreement, the
majority noted, prosecutors might never even enter the plea negotiations; therefore, it is not persuasive to suggest that waiver
of the Rules would discourage voluntary settlement. 268 "In sum,
there is no reason to believe that allowing negotiation as to
waiver of the plea-statement Rules will bring plea bargaining to
269
a grinding halt; it may well have the opposite effect."
Lastly, Mezzanatto asserted "that waiver agreements
should be forbidden because they invite prosecutorial overreaching and abuse." 270 Because of the extreme disparity in the

bargaining power of the parties in a plea negotiation, Mezzanatto argued, a waiver agreement would be "inherently unfair and coercive." 271 The majority's response was that this
would be an unfair assumption. 272 Just because there is a mere
potential for prosecutorial abuse, the bargaining process should
not stop altogether.27 3 To counter Mezzanatto's forecast of exploitation, the Court decided that the proper response, rather
than forbidding a defendant from waiving his exclusionary
rights, is to scrutinize each case to determine whether the
waiver agreement was fraudulent or coerced. 274 In conclusion,
the Court held that "absent some affirmative indication that the
agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an
agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the pleastatement Rules is valid and enforceable." 275
Justice Ginsburg wrote the concurring opinion and was
joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer.276 She succinctly restated the Court's holding as a finding that "allowing the Government to impeach [a defendant] with statements made during
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 805.
269. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 805 (1995).
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 26, United States v. Mezzanatto, 115
S. Ct. 797 (1995) (No. 93-1340)).
272. See id. at 806.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995).
276. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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plea negotiations is compatible with Congress' intent to, promote plea bargaining."27 7 Justice Ginsburg's purpose in writing, however, was to emphasize that this ruling allows only for
278
use of the defendant's statements for impeachment purposes.
She further suggested that a waiver to allow such statements to
be used in a prosecution's case-in-chief might more severely inhibit a defendant from attempting to negotiate a plea, and such
a use would be contrary to the legislative intent behind the
Rules. 279 However, since the government had not attempted to
use Mezzanatto's statements in such a fashion, Justice Gins280
burg declined to explore this idea further.
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justice Stevens, suggested that the question that the Court should have answered
in this case was whether Congress intended "to create a personal right subject to waiver by its individual beneficiaries"
when the Rules were adopted, and not whether respondent
Mezzanatto had met his burden of showing why the Rules
should not be waived. 28 ' Justice Souter stated that the majority
reached its decision not by answering the question of whether
or not Congress intended for this particular rule to be waived,
but by relying "on the general presumption in favor of recognizing waivers of rights, including evidentiary rights."28 2 Justice
Souter agreed with the majority that there is a presumption of
waivability of rights and privileges and that it is a sound policy,
but he further stated that where waiver of a right or privilege
conflicts "with a reading of the Rules as reasonably construed to
accord with the intent of Congress, there is no doubt that congressional intent should prevail." 2
The majority assumption, stated Justice Souter, appeared
to be that the only instances in which waiver of a right or privilege would be foreclosed is where a rule expressly allows for
waiver in its text.284 Accordingly, since there was no mention of
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 806 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
282. Id. at 807.
283. Id. at 806.
284. See id. at 807.
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waiver in the text of the Rules in question here, the majority
upheld the contract between Mezzanatto and the prosecutor. 28 5
But Justice Souter, finding "more to go on," argued that there
was "good reason to believe that Congress rejected the general
2 6
rule of waivability when it passed the Rules in issue here."

8

The dissenting opinion argued that the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules state that the purpose of these Rules is to
dispose of cases by compromise, and that "[a]s with compromise
offers generally,.

. .

free communication is needed, and security

against having an offer of compromise or related statement admitted in evidence effectively encourages it."287 Justice Souter
proposed that the Advisory Committee's Notes show that
Congress made two assumptions when the Rules were adopted:
first, that plea bargains and pleas "are to be encouraged,"
and second, that conditions of unrestricted candor, without
fear of recrimination, "are the most effective means of
288
encouragement."
When the statements of intent evidenced in the Advisory
Committee's Notes are combined with the Court's findings in
Santobello that plea-bargaining is to be encouraged, 28 9 the protections provided to a defendant by the Rules, believed Justice
Souter, are "meant to create something more than a personal
right shielding an individual from his imprudence. Rather, the
Rules are meant to serve the interest of the federal judicial system.., by creating the conditions understood by Congress to be
effective in promoting reasonable plea agreements." 290 Souter

further stated that there is "no indication that Congress intended merely a regime of such limited openness as might happen to survive market forces sufficient to supplant a default
rule of inadmissibility." 291 Having found evidence of legislative
intent in a number of sources to rebut the presumption of
waivability, Justice Souter then stated that the intent must be
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 807 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes).
288. Id. at 808.
289. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
290. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).
291. Id.
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followed, not usurped by the United States Supreme Court as it
292
was in this case.
The potential consequences which could stem from the majority opinion make it even more likely that Congress did not
intend for the protections of the Rules to be waivable, reasoned
Justice Souter. 293 His first prediction for the future of the Rules
was that they will, in time, cease to be applied at all. 294 Because
defendants generally are unable to contest a prosecutor's demand for a waiver, as their alternative is not to plea bargain at
all, use of waivers such as the one presented to Mr. Mezzanatto
will be routine. 295 Justice Souter's second predicted consequence of the majority decision is that, in time, prosecutors will
demand a waiver of a defendant's right to trial in exchange for
296
the mere opportunity to enter into a plea bargain.
[Alithough the erosion of the Rules has begun with this trickle,
the majority's reasoning will provide no principled limit to it. The
Rules draw no distinction between use of a statement for impeachment and use in the Government's case in chief. If objection
can be waived for impeachment use, it can be waived for use as
affirmative evidence, and if the government can effectively demand waiver in the former instance, there is no reason to believe
it will not do so just as successfully in the latter. When it does,
there is nothing this Court will legitimately be able to do about it.
The Court is construing a congressional Rule on the theory that
Congress meant to permit its waiver. Once that point is passed,
as it is today, there is no legitimate limit on admissibility of a
defendant's plea negotiation statements beyond what the Consti29 7
tution may independently impose or the traffic may bear.
IV.

Analysis

Justice Thomas has stated that there is a "background presumption" that all rules and rights are waivable. 298 To rebut
that presumption, therefore, there must be "some affirmative
292. See
293. See
294. See
295. See
296. See
dissenting).
297. Id.
298. See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 809.
United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 809 (1995) (Souter, J.,
supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
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indication of Congress' intent to preclude waiver." 299 Congressional intent can be shown either by express language in a rule
stating that the rule in question is not subject to waiver, or, in
language, by looking to the legislathe absence of such express 300
tive intent behind the rule.
The United States Supreme Court in Brooklyn Savings
Bank v. O'Neil301 stated that "the question of whether the statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute." 3 2 When the
Court, in Brooklyn, found that no such language in the Fair Labor Standards Act existed to give an indication of Congress' intent with respect to waiver of the Act's provisions, it did not
immediately presume that Congress' intent was to allow
waiver.30 3 On the contrary, the Court stated, "[i]n the absence
of evidence of specific Congressional intent, it becomes necessary to resort to a -broader consideration of the legislative policy
behind this provision as evidenced by its legislative history and
the provisions in and structure of the Act." 30 4 Using this lan-

guage, the Court found that the legislative history of this Act
evinced a policy of preventing private contracts between employers and employees which contracts, if allowed, could poten30 5
tially exploit employees and endanger the public welfare.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on the
language of Brooklyn in their holding that waiver of the rights
granted to a defendant under the plea bargaining Rules should
not be allowed. 30 6 The Ninth Circuit, using the language of
Brooklyn, determined that "[a]llowing a waiver of these [R]ules
would contravene and thwart the policy - efficient case resolution through plea bargaining - these rules were designed to
effectuate." 30 7 The United States Supreme Court, however, did
not find Brooklyn to be dispositive of the issue, stating that
Brooklyn is distinguishable from the case at bar since the his299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87, 112 and accompanying text.
324 U.S. 697 (1945).
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.

306. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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tory of the Fair Labor Standards Act evinced a policy of "'pre3
vent[ing] private contracts' on such matters." 08
The Court in Mezzanatto thus distinguished Brooklyn by
stating that there is "nothing in the structure or history of the
plea-statement Rules that suggests that they were aimed at
preventing private bargaining."30 9 This limited analysis misinterprets the relevant point that the Court in Brooklyn tried to
make: that in order to find congressional intent with regard to
waiver when a rule or statute is silent, courts must "resort to a
broader consideration of the legislative policy behind [the] provision."310 The Mezzanatto Court, in discussing Brooklyn, limited the applicability of Brooklyn to the legislative policy
behind the issue that faced the Court in that instance: preventing private bargaining. 3 11 While it may be argued that the
Rules are similarly designed to promote a larger public policy
by preventing private bargaining, Justice Thomas, in Mezzanatto, did not extend the essential elements of the Court's decision in Brooklyn, and in fact only discussed its application in
the narrow context of private bargaining, and not in the broader
312
context of legislative intent.
Despite the United States Supreme Court's previous statements regarding the importance of looking to legislative intent
to determine a question left unanswered, 313 the Mezzanatto
Court chose to ignore that path of analysis here. Justice
Thomas' opinion relies on the numerous rules and rights which
courts have found to be waivable. 314 Such a history, he believes,
creates a "background presumption" that, in the absence of express intent by Congress, rules and rights are waivable. 3 15 By
not following the Brooklyn Court's statement that a "broader
consideration of the legislative policy.., as evidenced by legislative history"31 6 is imperative in an instance such as that which
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
ing text.
316.

See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 131, 133, 150, 158 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 801-03; see supra notes 241-46 and accompanyBrooklyn Savings Bank, 324 U.S. at 706.
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the Mezzanatto Court faced, Justice Thomas' analysis of these
rules is incomplete.
The majority in Mezzanatto stated that "the mere existence
of a policy justification for the plea-statement Rules cannot provide a sound basis for rejecting the background presumption of
waivability."317 This statement clearly ignores the analytical
approach of Brooklyn. If the Mezzanatto Court's "presumption
of waivability" contravenes the very policy which Congress intended to establish when the plea statement Rules were enacted, 318 then that presumption, logically, is overcome. A
contrary finding clearly ignores legislative intent, and results in
the United States Supreme Court usurping Congress' authority.
Justice Souter believed that "Congress must have understood
that the judicial system's interest in candid plea discussions
would be threatened by recognizing waivers under Rules 410
and 11(e)(6) ....[T]he policy [the majority] endorse[d] is not the
319
policy that Congress intended when it enacted the Rules."
320
When notice is taken of the legislative history of these Rules,
it would appear that Justice Souter's dissent is correct. As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Touche Ross & Co.,
"[tihe ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one
of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."321 Although there

is no express waiver provision in the Rules' text, the evidence
that Justice Thomas sought of an "affirmative indication" of
Congress' intent not to waive the Rules' provisions was there to
be seen, and that intent should have been enough to overcome
the majority's presumption that these Rules should be
waivable.
An examination of the early legislative proposals for
amendments to the Rules is crucial in showing the legislative
intent behind the promulgation of the current versions of the
Rules. Congress explicitly rejected the Senate's proposal to
write an impeachment provision into the Rules, 322 and instead
317. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 805 n.5.
318. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
319. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
320. See supra Part II.B.
321. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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chose to state that the purpose behind the Rules was to foster
free communication and candid discussion.3 23 Justice Thomas
stated that "there is no basis for concluding that waiver will interfere with the Rules' goal of encouraging plea bargaining,"3 24
but it is difficult to imagine how "free communication" and "candid" discussion can occur when a defendant has a threat, such
as the one imposed by the government in this case, hanging

over his head.3 25 While Justice Thomas indicated that the

Ninth Circuit only considered the interests of a defendant, he
seems interested primarily in those of the prosecutor. 326 This
analysis ignores the issue of the transaction's effect on the plea
bargaining process as a whole, and the issue of whether, by ignoring the relative bargaining strengths of the parties to a plea
negotiation, the waiver process itself "discredits the federal
327
courts."

The Rules already have an express exception providing for
punishment of a defendant who commits perjury.328 The text of
the Rules, as enacted by Congress, allows for the admissibility
of a defendant's plea bargaining statements in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement. 329 While the majority
feels that permitting waiver of the rights guaranteed by the
plea statement Rules "enhances the truth-seeking function of
trials,"330 it is apparent that Congress considered the use of plea
statements for impeachment purposes, and expressly rejected
that enabling language in favor of the ability of a prosecutor to
bring a perjury trial or other criminal proceeding for false statement.331 The ill that the Court in Mezzanatto attempted to cure
was anticipated by Congress, and the remedy was already prescribed in the text of the Rules. 33 2 Justice Thomas stated, "we

will not interpret Congress' silence as an implicit rejection of
323. FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's notes; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6)
advisory committee's notes.
324. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 804 (1995).
325. See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
328. See FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
329. See supra notes 41, 43-44 and accompanying text.
330. United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 803 (1995).
331. See supra Part II.B; note 41 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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waivability."33 3 Congress was not mute, however; Justice
Thomas turned a deaf ear toward the intent which the Legislature clearly manifested in a rejection of the idea that plea negotiation statements ought to be allowed to impeach a defendant.
The majority's reasoning opens a door to potentially disastrous consequences. The credibility and integrity of the court
system will be violated if Justice Souter's two predictions come
to pass.33 4 First, the Rules will be swallowed by the exception
and they probably won't be followed at all. 335 "[I]t is probably
only a matter of time until the Rules are dead letters, "336 stated
Souter, and he is correct. There is little reason for a prosecutor
not to take full advantage of the cards the Court has dealt them,
and automatically demand a waiver before each negotiation.
Second, there is no way to stop the prosecution from requesting more than just a waiver of the right to use plea statements for impeachment purposes. 3 3 7 "[A]lthough the erosion of
the Rules has begun with this trickle, the majority's reasoning
38
will provide no principled limit to it," stated Justice Souter.A
The language used by the majority allows for a waiver of a defendant's right to exclusion of plea negotiation statements as
long as the waiver given by that defendant is knowingly and
voluntarily made.33 9 This language could, potentially, allow a
prosecutor to use a defendant's statement in the prosecutor's
case in chief,340 or allow a demand that a defendant waive his
right to trial in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to enter
into a plea negotiation. 34 1 While the waiver will be acceptable
333. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 803.
334. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
336. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 809 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
337. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. While the issue in this
particular case was use of plea statements to impeach a defendant, Justice Souter
notes that the language of the Rules does not draw a distinction between use of the
statements for impeachment purposes and use as affirmative evidence. See supra
note 297 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg does, however, note that such a
use could "more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and
thereby inhibit plea bargaining." Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. at 806 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
341. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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as long as it is "knowing and voluntary,"342 given the relative
bargaining strength of the prosecution, one wonders when such
a waiver exacted as a price for entering into a discussion is truly
voluntary.
In the absence of an indication of legislative intent to the
contrary, the majority's rationale and the basis for their decision is correct; the presumption of waivability has a solid foundation in precedent.4 3 However, in Mezzanatto, the majority
failed to look beyond the text of the Rules to determine whether
Congress intended for the provisions of these Rules to be waivable. The United States Supreme Court did not recognize the
intent of Congress which was there to be seen, and in so doing
they ignored the fact that Congress' will must prevail over the
judiciary's desire to interpret statutes as they see fit.
V.

Conclusion

The decision in Mezzanatto marks the beginning of the end
for Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e)(6). Allowing negotiation discussions to be used
at trial to impeach a defendant violates the very principles Congress intended to promote when it enacted these Rules. The
Rules, which were intended to create an efficient system of case
resolution through plea negotiations, have effectively been eviscerated by this holding of the United Supreme States Court, as
the Court relied solely on the presumption of waivability of all
rules and rights, rather than deferring to the legislative intent
behind these Rules which was arguably there to be seen. In so
doing, the United States Supreme Court has vastly eroded the
strengths of these Rules and their ability to protect a defendant
if a negotiation does not result in an acceptable plea, as prosecutors are unlikely to invite a defendant to negotiate a plea
without exacting the price of a waiver of the right to have any
statements made in the negotiation excluded from use at trial.
Pamela Bennett Louis

342. See supra note 105 and accomanying text.
343. See supra Part II.C.
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